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PRIVACY AND INTELLIGENT
TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY
Dorothy J. Glancyt
Since surface transportation moves people and goods along pub-
lic roads and transit systems, it may seem odd to be concerned about
privacy in such a highly public context. And yet, respecting privacy
will be important, as advanced technologies improve highways and
other surface transportation systems across the American landscape.
Without proper respect for privacy, application of advanced transpor-
tation technologies to surface transportation could become either a
technological road not taken' or a veritable web of information which
subjugates individuals and trammels personal freedom.2 Figuring out
how to structure transportation applications of advanced computer,
communications and other technologies so that the technological in-
frastructure respects individual privacy will be among the most chal-
lenging legal and social issues which confront the new transportation
technologies known as Intelligent Transportation Systems, or ITS.3
Copyright 1995 by Dorothy J. Glancy.
t Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. Wellesley College;
J.D. Harvard Law School. Professor Glancy directed the Santa Clara Privacy and IVHS Legal
Research Project sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration, United States Department
of Transportation. The views expressed in this article are those of its author and do not represent
the views of the Federal Highway Administration or the United States Department of
Transportation.
1. I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I...
Robert Frost, "The Road Not Taken" (1916).
2. Alexander Solzhenitsyn described such a web of information in depicting bureaucratic
recordkeeping in the Soviet Union:
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, each
containing a number of questions. ... There are thus hundreds of little threads
radiating from every man, millions of threads in all. If these threads were sud-
denly to become visible, the whole sky would look like a spider's web, and if they
materialized as rubber bands, busses, trais and even people would all lose the
ability to move, and the wind would be unable to carry torn-up newspapers or
autumn leaves along the streets of the city. They are not visible, they are not
material, but every man is constantly aware of their existence.... Each man,
permanently aware of his own invisible threads, naturally develops a respect for
the people who manipulate the threads. ALEXANDER SorzsalursyN, CANcER
WARD (1969).
3. Currently known as Intelligent Transportation Systems, or ITS, the most prominent of
these technologies were called Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems, or IVHS, during the early
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The relationship between privacy and ITS is reciprocal.4 Privacy
will, without doubt, be affected by ITS. But ITS will also be affected
by concerns about privacy. This circular relationship between privacy
issues and ITS, is complicated by the fact that neither privacy nor ITS
is simple or static. This article will explore some of the interesting
interactions between privacy and ITS. It will begin by sketching the
outlines of ITS technologies and will then consider the nature of pri-
vacy concerns about ITS, followed by a discussion of ITS concerns
about privacy and privacy laws potentially applicable to ITS. A dis-
cussion of some strategies for safeguarding privacy will form the con-
cluding section of this article. Protecting privacy should enhance the
effectiveness, as well as the acceptance, of the intelligent transporta-
tion systems which will weave together tomorrow's surface transpor-
tation infrastructure.
I. THE CAPACITY OF ITS TECHNOLOGIES To A;FECr PRIVACY
Intelligent transportation technologies have the capacity to affect
individual privacy in many ways. Whether ITS is deployed by gov-
ernment agencies, private corporations, or some combination of both
in public-private partnerships, ITS technologies provide an unprece-
dented mechanism for pervasive real-time surveillance of each per-
son's physical location and movement from place to place. These
technologies will also be capable of comprehensively collecting, ag-
gregating and manipulating travel and other personal data about an
individual throughout the individual's lifetime. ITS technologies will
also be able to communicate not only traffic information and transit
1990s. They had earlier been called "Mobility 2000" and "Smart Highways." In early 1991,
Sections 6050 et seq. of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (known as
ISTEA, informally pronounced "ice tea") enacted the Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems Act
of 1991 and established the "IVHS" moniker for the technologies. By 1994, increased emphasis
on intermodalism and public transit applications of these advanced surface transportation tech-
nologies seemed to require a broader umbrella term for these highly varied transportation tech-
nologies. ITS, or Intelligent Transportation Systems, seems to be more clearly inclusive of the
range of various types of surface transportation systems which will be parts of ITS, including not
only highways but also public transit and other intermodal transportation links. Nevertheless, the
many changes in ITS terminology, not to mention technologies, seems to some people to give
ITS an almost covert quality, as if these technologies were taking on a intentionally confusing
series of multiple personas. Actually, the reason for the change in names has been quite the
contrary - an effort to present the technologies as clearly as possible.
4. From the initiation of the IVHS program in ISTEA, the Congress recognized that pri-
vacy was among the "nontechnical constraints" which the intelligent transportation technologies
would face. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 2189, § 6054. The United States Department of
Transportation also foresaw that privacy would be an important issue for ITS and has supported
privacy research such as the Santa Clara Project. Some of the project's research is reflected in
this article and in the materials from the Santa Clara Symposium on Privacy and IVHS presented
in this special issue of the SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TmznoLoaoy LAW JOURNAL.
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schedules to travellers, but also other types of information, such as
targeted advertising which may be intrusive to some potential ITS
users. A few examples of potential privacy-ITS interaction will high-
light the variety of privacy issues ITS is likely to raise. Existing forms
of ITS enable remote electronic monitoring of a commercial vehicle,
such as a truck or an intercity bus. This form of ITS can be used
simply to track the location of the truck or bus. But it can also be used
by the truck or bus company to follow and to keep track of every
move made by the individual driving the bus. ITS could also provide
the exact geographical location of a passenger travelling on the bus.
Continuous monitoring of the weight, speed and tailpipe emissions of
commercial vehicles, such as trucks or busses will also record much of
the working life of the truck's driver. Only slightly more advanced
ITS diagnostic systems can automatically inform dispatchers and law
enforcement personnel not only about such potential safety problems
as worn tires or brakes on the vehicle, but also the physical or psycho-
logical impairment of the vehicle's driver. Automatic evaluation of
vehicular fitness may be a useful safety measure. But continuously
communicating on-going evaluations of driver fatigue (patterns of
drift-and-jerk movements) or impairment (weaving) to an ITS moni-
toring system raises privacy concerns.
In the future, interactive computer and personal communications
technologies, such as personal navigation assistance devices, will pro-
vide a driver with driving directions (known as route guidance) as well
as real-time information about traffic congestion and adverse weather
conditions between a driver's current location and her destination. To
provide this ITS service, an ITS-equipped traffic management center
will maintain a two-directional loop of individualized continuous real-
time information about a driver's location and destination and perhaps
also about the driver herself. One direction of the ITS information
loop will continuously communicate to the traffic management center
the driver's location, speed and destination, as well as perhaps other
information from on-board diagnostic systems. Going in the other di-
rection, the ITS information loop will communicate back to the driver
from the traffic management center such information as traffic flow,
directions, and perhaps other information specifically relevant to that
individual driver. To the extent information about the traveller in this
information loop is computerized and stored, it becomes a detailed
travel history of where the driver was at all times in the past, as well
as her usual travel patterns and travel plans. All of this information
could be very useful to third parties who might want to follow or to
1995]
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keep track of the driver. Such third party trackers might include law
enforcement agents, private investigators, advertisers or stalkers.
ITS relational data bases can be designed to compile an individ-
ual traveler's planned itineraries, as well as detailed data regarding the
times and places of the individual's actual travel. Patterns and profiles
of the person's choices can be created and further databases compiled.
For example, ITS can collect data regarding how often a particular
person goes to a particular location, such as a supermarket. Additional
ITS data can be collected regarding how often the person stops along
the way at the location of a different type of store, such as a liquor
store. A personal profile of the person can be compiled into a
database of all travellers who stop at liquor stores on the way to super-
markets. That database can be further sorted according to personal
characteristics of this type of traveller (such as gender, race, age,
height or weight) or according to particular supermarket chains or
types of liquor stores, or according to all of the foregoing factors. In
short, ITS applications can be designed to collect, digitize and manip-
ulate transportation data about where individual travellers go, what
routes they take to get there, and where they stop along the way.
Since digitized data is almost infinitely replicable, and potentially
eternal, other relational databases can link ITS transportation data
about an individual with other types of information (such as law en-
forcement, insurance, lifestyle and credit data) to form a comprehen-
sive profile about an individual ITS user. Individual profiles from
many ITS users can be aggregated and used to create valuable market-
ing forecasts. The privacy concerns about this type of secondary use
of ITS data multiply with each additional use of ITS-collected data,
particularly when the individual involved may not know about, much
less agree to the manipulation of information about her use of surface
transportation.
ITS may also augment route guidance directions from where a
driver is to where she wants to go, with advertisements regarding fuel,
food and lodging or, potentially other types of consumer demand-gen-
erating information. To the extent that an ITS service has already col-
lected detailed information about the driver and/or the vehicle, ITS
advertisements can be personalized and targeted to appeal to particular
travellers, based on personal preference profiles. ITS diagnostic tech-
nologies designed to evaluate the status of both vehicles and drivers
will enable ITS to personalize ITS advertising in remarkable ways,
which some might find intrusive. New passenger cars with on-board
computers already communicate to their drivers a variety of informa-
tion about the vehicle, such as fuel and break status and the opera-
[Vol. 11
PRIVACY & INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION
tional condition of emissions control systems. ITS communications
technologies will be capable of automatically sending such informa-
tion from the vehicle's diagnostic systems to external monitors, such
as ITS system managers, regulatory agencies or law enforcement
agencies. Commercial applications of ITS on trucks already include
automatic, non-stop weighing and clearance at state and national bor-
ders. In the future, automatic communication of vehicular diagnostics
will be able to send to ITS system managers such data as readings
from seat and seatbelt sensors which automatically configure seats,
seatbelts, and airbags to account for the presence and size of passen-
gers, to better protect people such as children or those of above or
below average height or weight. Communication of such personal
characteristics information, along with other diagnostic data, to ITS
traveller information service centers, would make possible tempting
opportunities for advertisers.
Cruise control devices and anti-lock breaks are already popular
automated applications of ITS. In the future, automatic control sys-
tems of this type and even automated highways will partially or com-
pletely control vehicles by means of expert systems, so that vehicle
operators will have little or no control over their vehicles while the
vehicles are on an automated highway. From a privacy standpoint,
this transfer of control may feel dehumanizing to the individual who
no longer controls her vehicle as it carries her to her pre-programmed
destination. Individual choice and control, as well as the autonomy
associated with driving would be compromised in these automated
ITS applications, particularly if participation in ITS were not
voluntary.
On the other hand, ITS technologies will in some ways enhance
privacy and other personal rights of travellers. Examples of potential
ITS contributions to individual rights range from enabling vision-im-
paired persons to drive more safely to liberating countless drivers
whose lives and choices would otherwise be constrained by long lines
for toll collection or by foggy road conditions. In all of these and
5. For example, imagine a parent driving along a. highway with a preschool child care-
fully buckled into her seatbelt. The ITS communications loop is automatically sending data that
a small person is in one of the seats. Back comes the following traveller service message: "Hi!
This is your old friend Yoggie the Dinosaur. A creamy yogurt cone would be great right now.
There is a Yoggie Shoppe at the next exit. What is your favorite flavor? Chocolate? Vanilla?
Strawberry? Yoggie's got them ALL! Your pretty green Chrysler Caravan will be welcome at
Yoggie's, next exit. NEXT EXIT! I will be looking for you at the next exit." Such a communi-
cation might delight the child to whom it is designed to appeal. But it may be considered a gross
intrusion by the parent who is driving the car.
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countless additional ways, iTS will profoundly affect the privacy, as
well as the mobility, of surface transportation users.
II. ITS TECHNOLOGIES
The technologies associated with ITS include a variety of appli-
cations of surveillance, communications, data processing, traffic con-
trol, navigation and other advanced technologies as well as
applications of expert systems. Most of the technologies contem-
plated for use in ITS are already existing technologies, a number of
which derive from military defense applications.6 What is new about
ITS is the systematic effort to apply these available technologies to
improve surface transportation through combined efforts of both the
public and the private sectors. The goals of the ITS program are "to
improve safety, reduce congestion, enhance mobility, minimize envi-
ronmental impact, save energy and promote economic productivity."'
Currently available forms of ITS include antilock brakes, automatic
toll collection, satellite-based vehicle location using Global Position-
ing Systems (GPS), and many other technological enhancements for
both vehicles and highways. Various smart card technologies' and a
wide range of enhanced communication methods for providing trans-
portation information, including variable message signs, public transit
information kiosks and in-vehicle routing assistance based on current
traffic conditions, are all aspects of ITS.
Just what ITS is and does has changed somewhat over time and is
likely to change a great deal more as ITS develops in the future. As
currently conceived, the federal ITS program is organized around user
services including pre-trip and in-route travel information, compre-
hensive real-time traffic management, electronic toll and transit fare
payment services, safety and pollution monitoring, personalized public
transit, computerized route guidance and tracking systems, and auto-
matic collision avoidance. ITS applications in the next century will
6. rrS sometimes refers to using off-the-rack existing components. But most of the avail-
able technology, such as missile guidance systems and infrared vision-enhancement devices for
jet pilots, must be adapted from defense applications for use in the surface transportation context.
Facilitating that adaption to peaceful uses is part of the defense-conversion objective of the ITS
program.
7. UNITED STATES Dm TamNr OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL PROGRAM PLAN FOR
INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SysTEMs (rrS) (Final Draft, Nov. 1994) at I1-5. [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL PROGRAM PLAN]
8. ITS contemplates use of read-only cards or tags, read-write devices, and even various
versions of stored-value cards and digitized cash.
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include automated highways on which cars, trucks and busses are con-
trolled by computer systems, rather than by individual drivers.'
The current official description of ITS contains the following
twenty-nine ITS user services categorized in seven common areas or
"bundles:"
A. Travel and Transportation Management
1. In-Route Driver Information
2. Route Guidance
3. Traveler Services Information
4. Traffic Control
5. Incident Management
6. Emissions Testing and Mitigation
B. Travel Demand Management
1. Pre-Trip Travel Information
2. Ride Matching and Reservation
3. Demand Management and Operations
C. Public Transportation Operations
1. Public Transportation Management
2. In-Route Transit Information
3. Personalized Public Transit
4. Public Travel Safety
D. Electronic Payment
1. Electronic Payment Services
E. Commercial Vehicle Operations
1. Commercial Vehicle Electronic Clearance
2. Automated Roadside Safety Inspection
3. On-board Safety Monitoring
4. Commercial Vehicle Administrative Processes
5. Hazardous Materials Incident Response
6. Commercial Fleet Management
F. Emergency Management
1. Emergency Notification and Personal Safety
2. Emergency Vehicle Management
G. Advanced Vehicle Control and Safety Systems
1. Longitudinal Collision Avoidance
2. Lateral Collision Avoidance
3. Intersection Collision Avoidance
4. Vision Enhancement for Crash Avoidance
5. Safety Readiness
6. Pre-Crash Restraint Deployment
9. The Automated Highway Systems (AHS) aspects of ITS will develop automatic vehi-
cles which are autonomous of driver control. A major development program is already under
way.
1995]
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7. Automated Highway System °
The ITS user services noted above combine one or more of the fol-
lowing technical functions:
Traffic Surveillance, which refers to "Surveillance technologies
that collect information about the status of the traffic stream. Possi-
ble technologies include loop detectors, infrared sensors, radar and
microwave sensors, machine vision, aerial surveillance, closed cir-
cuit television, acoustic, in-pavement magnetic, and vehicle
probes."
Vehicle Surveillance, which refers to "Surveillance technologies
that collect a variety of information about specific vehicles. These
technologies include weigh-in-motion devices, vehicle identifica-
tion, vehicle classification, and vehicle location."
Inter-Agency Coordination, which refers to 'Fechnologies that
connect travel-related facilities to other agencies such as police,
emergency services providers, weather forecasters and observers,
and among Traffic Management Centers (TMC), transit operators,
etc."
One-Way Mobile Communications, which refers to "Any communi-
cation technology that transmits information to potentially mobile
reception sites but cannot receive information back from those
sites. Possible technologies providing this function include High-
way Advisory Radio, FM subcarrier, spread spectrum, microwave,
infrared, commercial broadcasts, and infrared or microwave
beacons."
Two-Way Mobile Communications, which refers to "Any commu-
nication technology that transmits information to potentially mobile
reception sites and allows receipt of information from those same
sites. Possible technologies include cellular telephones, 2-way ra-
dio, spread spectrum, microwave, infrared, and 2-way satellite."
Stationary Communications, which refers to "Any communication
technology that connects stationary sites. Technologies include fi-
ber optics, microwave, radio, land lines."
Individual Traveler Interface, which refers to "Devices that provide
information flow to a specific traveler. Technologies meeting this
function include touch screens, keypads, graphic displays and com-
puter voices at kiosks; keypads, computer voice, and head-up dis-
plays in vehicles; personal communications devices carried with
the traveler; and audiotext from any phone."
Payment Systems, which refers to '"Technologies that enable elec-
tronic fund transfer between the traveler and the service provider.
10. NA-oNAL PoaLmi PLAN, supra note 7, at 1I-2 - 111-3.
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The technology areas include Automated Vehicle Identification
(AVI), smart cards, and electronic funds management systems.
This function overlaps with the Electronic Payment user service."
Variable Message Displays, which refers to 'Technologies that al-
low centrally controlled messages to be displayed or announced au-
dibly to multiple users at a common location such as a roadside
display or display board in a transit terminal. These technologies
would typically be applied to provide information on highway con-
ditions, traffic restrictions, and transit status."
Signalized Traffic Control, which refers to 'Technologies that al-
low for real-time control of traffic flow. Possible technologies in-
clude optimized traffic signals, ramp metering, reversible lane
designation, and ramp/lane closures."
Restrictions Traffic Control, which refers to "Operational tech-
niques that restrict the use of roadways according to regional goals.
Techniques include HOV restrictions, parking restrictions, and road
use (congestion) pricing."
Navigation, which refers to 'Technologies that determine vehicle
position in real time. Technologies that provide this function in-
clude GPS, LORAN, dead reckoning, localized beacons, map
database matching, and cellular triangulation."
Database Processing, which refers to "Technologies that manipu-
late and configure or format transportation-related data for sharing
on various platforms. General purpose data base software currently
exists and is currently being adapted to transportation needs such as
data fusion, maps, and travel services."
Traffic Prediction Data Processing, which refers to "Data process-
ing relating to prediction of future traffic situations. Algorithms
under development include areas such as real-time traffic predic-
tion, and traffic assignment."
Traffic Control Data Processing, which refers to "Data processing
related to the real-time control of traffic. Algorithms under devel-
opment include optimal control and incident detection, and the in-
teraction of route selection and traffic control."
Routing Data Processing, which refers to "Data processing related
to routing of vehicles including the generation of step-by-step driv-
ing instructions to a specified destination. Algorithms under devel-
opment include the scheduling of drivers, vehicles, and cargo; route
selection; commercial vehicle scheduling, and route guidance."
In-Vehicle Sensors/Devices, which refers to 'Technologies provid-
ing a range of sensing functions to be located within vehicles.
Functions addressed by these technologies include monitoring of
vehicle performance and driver performance; determination of ve-
1995]
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hicle position relative to the roadway, other vehicles, and obstacles;
improvement of vision in adverse conditions; and on-board security
monitoring."' 1
Some of these ITS functions, such as variable message displays,
signalized traffic control and traffic prediction data processing will
have very little relationship with privacy, because these technologies
do not focus on individual travellers. Other ITS functions, such as
traffic control data processing and restrictions traffic control, will indi-
rectly affect privacy by affecting transportation choices. Combining
these technical capabilities into a wide variety of interactive and intel-
ligent systems and services is the role of ITS.
III. PRIVACY CONCERNS ABOUT ITS
Privacy is at least as multifaceted and variable as ITS technolo-
gies. Privacy laws relevant to ITS will vary depending on where and
by whom a particular ITS application is operated. Since ITS is com-
posed of a variety of government and private sector systems, as well
as public-private partnerships, privacy concerns about ITS are charac-
terized by a particularly lively variety. As the Santa Clara Symposium
papers and other materials in this issue underscore, variability and
open-endedness have also been key features of privacy law, since
Brandeis' initial suggestion in 1890 that the law ought to recognize
and protect a legal right of privacy.12 Privacy concerns have come a
long way since then.'"
The notion of a general legal right to privacy first suggested by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis presented privacy as an al-
ready existing common law right which protects each individual's "in-
violate personality."' 4 They asserted that "The common law secures
to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent
his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others .. .fix[ing] the limits of the publicity which shall be given
them."" Almost thirty years later, Brandeis maintained that this same
privacy right constrains government, just as he had earlier argued for
legal redress for invasions of privacy by the private sector. According
to Brandeis, the purpose of the Constitution is "to protect Americans
11. Id.atV-4-V-6.
12. See Dorothy Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARiZ. L. REv. 1 (1979).
13. The development of privacy law is detailed in L THOMAS McCARTHY, Tim RItrrs oF
PuBucrrn AND PRIVACY (1987 and supps.) and SHELDON W. HALPERN, THm LAW O DEFAMA-
nON, PRiVACY, Pumacrry ANt "MoRAL RirHT's" (1988).
14. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. RPv. 193,
205 (1890).
15. Id. at 198.
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in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations."
He insisted that the makers of the Constitution "conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the pri-
vacy of the individual, whatever the employed, must be deemed a vio-
lation" of the Constitution.
16
By 1960, William Prosser had decided that the right to privacy
was articulated in a group of four distinct bases for civil liability in
tort: appropriation of another person's name or likeness, intrusion on
a person's seclusion or into his private life, public disclosure of em-
barrassing private facts about an individual, and publicity which
places a person in a false light. 7 A few years later, the Restatement,
Second of Torts, for which Prosser was the Reporter, adopted these
four torts as parts of the Second Torts Restatement.' 8 In 1967, Alan
Westin defined privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institu-
tions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others."'19 Westin suggested
that privacy performs four types of functions for individuals in demo-
cratic societies: "personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evalua-
tion, and limited and protected communication."'2 Arthur R. Miller,
whose influential The Assault on Privacy was published in 1971, re-
marked in a 1991 speech that, "I have come to realize that there is
something quite primordial about privacy. It is a value people believe
in and want. Even people who do not necessarily seek it out on a day
to day basis would like to know that they can have it when they want
and seek it. The ever-changing character of the issues is a constant
reminder that the value is something that we cherish and we constantly
think about and need."'"
In a sense, the many commentators about the meaning of privacy
are all persuasive in one way or another. But that multi-faceted qual-
ity does not dissolve privacy in meaningless ambiguity. Constitu-
tional law scholar, Paul Freund in his provocative essay, "Privacy:
One Concept or Many" suggested that even if a right of privacy is not
a very precise legal rule, "it would be impoverishing to exclude it as
16. Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
17. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960).
18. REsTATEmEr, SECOND, OF ToRs, §§ 652A - 6521.
19. ALAN F. WEsTN, PRIVACY Am FREEDOM 7 (1967).
20. Id. at 32.
21. Arthur R. Miller, The Right of Privacy - A Look through the Kaleidoscope, 46 S.M.U.
L. REv. 37, 38 (1992).
1995]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
the term of a legal principle."2 2 Professor Freund noted the difference
between principles and rules: "A higher order of generality is not only
tolerable in the statement of principles; it is to be encouraged ... A
rule is a particularization that describes the state of the law in a de-
fined context, and prescribes with a relatively high degree of immedi-
acy and precision. A principle is a more plastic formulation, useful
for predicting and shaping the course of legal development. It is in the
latter context that the right of privacy is of cardinal worth. '23 Senator
Sam J. Ervin, Jr., the chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee,
agreed. Senator Ervin suggested that "In the end, privacy depends
upon society's recognition, and protection of, the importance and uni-
queness of each individual."'24 That suggestion seems to direct atten-
tion back to the original notion of the right to privacy as protection for
individual personality initially suggested by Warren and Brandeis. In
this most general of senses, privacy is certain to affect twenty-first
century technologies,' such as ITS, in significant ways. People want
technology, such as ITS, to be structured and managed so that the
technology does not interfere with privacy. Their demand is not that
ITS needs to manage privacy; but rather that ITS needs to respect
privacy. This broad understanding of privacy as a principle associated
with respect for individual human dignity underlies this discussion of
privacy and ITS.26
A different way to understand privacy concerns about ITS comes
from asking ordinary people what they think about ITS transportation
technologies and the potential impacts of ITS on privacy. That was
the strategy adopted in creating the following "top-ten list of privacy
concerns." The list is not the product of a scientific survey. Rather, it
reflects informal conversations with people who expressed interest in
]TS technologies.27 The list highlights some recurring patterns in
22. Paul Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, NoMos XIII: PRIvAcY 182, 198 (1971).
23. Id. at 197.
24. Sam J. Ervin, The Computer vs. Our Constitution, 1 BAIwusrER 14, 16 (1974).
25. See Lawrence Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the
Electronic Frontier, FIRsT CONFERENCE ON CoMpurERs, FREEDoM & PmrVAcy (James Warren
ed. 1991) and Steven Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Age Economy:
Can we Handle Treasury's New Police Technology? 34 JunMcs J. 383 (1994).
26. See also Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 962 (1964); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YA.E L. J. 475 (1968). In contrast, those who have
suggested that individual privacy can and should be managed may have forgotten the old-fash-
ioned privacy demand from the bygone era of punch-cards: "Do not fold, spindle or mutilate"
people.
27. The conversations reflected here took place between February and September of 1994,
at a time when ITS technologies were known as IVHS. Although the questions and comments
were in terms of IVHS, the nature of the privacy concerns expressed was not affected by the
change in acronym.
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what potential ITS users had to say about how intelligent transporta-
tion technologies were likely to affect privacy.
In addition to the ten listed privacy concerns, two initial reactions
to ITS seem to be nearly universal when people begin to think and to
talk about ITS. First, most people have difficulty understanding ITS.
In part because of the dynamic and variable qualities of the many dif-
ferent ITS technologies and in part because only a few examples of
ITS are parts of everyday experience, ITS has an almost science-fic-
tion quality for many people. That lack of understanding is in itself a
potential privacy problem. To the extent that respecting privacy will
involve real choices on the part of ITS users with regard to whether or
not they will use various ITS services, such choices must be under-
standable and informed. Assuring that choices to use or to avoid ITS
services are based on meaningful information will be one of the major
challenges ITS will face in meeting privacy concerns. A second inter-
esting initial response to descriptions of ITS, even before privacy was
mentioned, was the nearly universal reaction that ITS "sounds inter-
esting, but creepy."
After these two initial reactions to ITS, the following Top-Ten
List of Privacy Concerns about ITS emerged. The list begins with the
most frequently expressed privacy concern - automatic secret
surveillance.
1. ITS applications can be used invisibly to track a targeted
individual's movements from place to place.
Although no extensive law enforcement uses of ITS systems and
technologies are contemplated by ITS development plans,28 many
people believe that remote, real-time surveillance of individuals is the
main purpose of ITS. People seem concerned not only about law en-
forcement surveillance by government agencies, but also about non-
governmental surveillance by private investigators. The possibility
that stalkers might be able to use ITS was a matter of great concern to
a number of people. The fear that ITS will be used to track and collect
detailed information about an individual's movements without the in-
dividual's knowledge or consent was palpable. Even people who con-
sider themselves unlikely to be targeted for any kind of surveillance
seem to feel that their privacy would be affected by an ITS operation
which at any time could target them. Some people describe ITS as an
unseen system of potential surveillance which would cause them to
28. In fact only two, of the twenty-nine, ITS user services have law enforcement ramifica-
tions. They are emissions testing and commercial vehicle operations.
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constrain their. travel choices to avoid potential scrutiny, whether or
not they were actually being tracked.29
The suggestion that ITS might adopt a single "smart" transporta-
tion card to be used to pay for the use of toll roads, toll bridges and
parking facilities, as well as for transit fares, intensified privacy con-
cerns about ITS as a comprehensive surveillance system. Such mul-
timodal ITS payment systems magnify fears that ITS will enable a
central automated monitor to keep minute-by-minute track of where a
targeted individual is located at virtually all times, "with no escape."
The fact that ITS vehicle surveillance would be electronic and invisi-
ble, gave rise to concerns that targeted individuals will be followed
remotely so that they never even become aware that they are being,
have been, or will be tracked.
2. ITS applications can be used automatically to collect
comprehensive information about when and where every
person travels.
This second most frequently expressed type of privacy concern
about ITS is particularly interesting because the people who express it
usually are well aware that the information which ITS applications
collect is neither very personal, nor very private. ITS information
about individuals consists almost entirely of information about a per-
son's movements in such public settings as roadways and transit sys-
tems. What seems to trouble people from a privacy standpoint is that
the information is potentially so comprehensive - a nearly complete
reflection of when and where each individual has travelled, possibly
over an entire lifetime. The fact that ITS systems, in the short run at
least, will not contain anywhere nearly comprehensive information
about any particular individual does not seem to affect these privacy
concerns. It is the potential for ITS to develop into such a comprehen-
sive information collection enterprise which seems to generate serious
privacy concerns, even before any information has been collected.
Moreover, people also seem to feel that ITS technologies will
take from them something which is uniquely theirs, has value, and
which at the same time both reflects them and can have consequences
for them - the way they move about in the world. Many people are
willing to consent to use of various types information about them-
selves, including transportation information. But they want to be
given the choice. That independent-minded Americans want to be
asked to cooperate voluntarily in intelligent transportation systems,
29. Professor Reiman's, Driving to the Panopticon, supra at , discusses this troubling
sense of being a potential target.
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and to be given a choice whether to cooperate or not, seems to reflect
a basic part of American culture, in which independent individuals
demand respect and resist manipulation.
As a practical matter, people are also concerned that the purpose
of collecting comprehensive transportation information regarding
everywhere each individual goes is so that individual transportation
information can be retrieved and used, or manipulated, later. Should
someone (whether in law enforcement, litigation, direct marketing or
out of simple curiosity) want to establish an individual's travel profile
or detailed travel history, such ITS records would provide a conve-
nient information source. People prefer not to have ITS collect the
information in the first place, rather than have to worry about prevent-
ing others from using it to invade their privacy sometime in the future.
Often people talked about keeping the camel's nose out of the tent. In
the last century Justice Bradley used a Latin phrase, obsta principiis,
(withstand beginnings) in Boyd v. United States,30 to insist on the im-
portance of preventing even the first initial steps toward interfering
with the privacy interests protected by the fourth and fifth
amendments.
3. ITS will create a computerized personal travel profile which
will be used to make decisions about an individual, as well
as to predict and to manipulate the individual's future
choices about transportation and other matters.
People are concerned that ITS-generated travel profiles will
threaten privacy because such a profile can become a substitute for the
person herself. Profiles of this type seem dehumanizing to individuals
at best. If a profile is different from the individual's own self-image,
the disjunction can be damaging psychologically. At the least, such
disjunction tends to undermine a person's self-respect. These types of
privacy concerns about ITS are sometimes expressed in complaints
about the tendency of ITS to reduce the complexity of an individual
human personality to ciphers and formulas. It makes no difference
that ITS information is not very personal or private, when compared,
for example, with data about a person's health or financial status.
People seem to be concerned when a comprehensive information pro-
file is constructed about any aspect of their lives. Moreover, the trans-
portation information which ITS will collect is likely to reveal other
aspects of a person's private life. For example, locations can indicate
places of worship, theaters, libraries and bookstores.
30. 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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4. ITS applications can aggregate, or connect up, stored
information about an individual's travel patterns with other
information regarding that individual.
People are very concerned that ITS information about a person
will be linked with other types of information, such as the person's
political affiliation, religion, known associates, buying patterns, insur-
ance, health and the like. In part, this is an objection to manipulation
and use of ITS information about an individual without the individ-
ual's consent. This type of privacy concern also reflects people's ob-
jections to being treated impersonally. If ITS information is
incorporated into an overall information profile of an individual, that
the profile can be used as a substitute for dealing with the individual
personally. People also want to be able to decide for themselves
whether or not ITS information about them will be compared or
matched or compiled with other information.
5. ITS applications can use or disclose information about an
individual's travel history or profile in ways which may both
reflect him or her and affect his or her future opportunities
and choices.
People are concerned that ITS will result in labels, such as
"chronic speeder," "polluter," or "frequently visits red light district,"
being attached to people. An individual, who does not perceive her-
self the way she is labeled, may not only find such labels jarring. She
may also be concerned that some of these labels can affect her life and
her opportunities as, say, a school bus driver, environmental activist or
pastoral counselor.
6. ITS can manipulate individual decisions about modes, times
and destinations of travel by means of route guidance, traffic
congestion information, persuasion and advertisements of
products and services.
People raise privacy concerns about these ITS functions because
they fear that ITS will be used to manipulate individual choices about
transportation and other matters. People express concern about being
subjected to unwanted advertising information and manipulation by
ITS traffic congestion information or congestion pricing, known as
travel demand management. They dislike the idea of being "man-
aged" by a faceless and unseen iTS traffic management system. This
type of privacy concern reflects the general preference people have to
manage and control themselves. Some people express particular con-
cern that they will be unable to switch off what they fear will be a
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barrage of ITS information intruding into their private lives and
thoughts, in their homes and automobiles. Just the suggestion that an
overriding 911 system could issue warnings of dangerous Weather or
driving conditions, whether or not the person has turned on her ITS
system, causes people to fear the use of ITS as an involuntary com-
munications medium for other sorts of messages, political, social or
advertising.
7. ITS monitoring and reporting of vehicle and operator
conditions can be used to override individual travel
decisions.
This type of privacy concern objects to use of ITS monitoring
capabilities, combined with automatic controls over whether and how
vehicles and drivers will be allowed to travel. People are concerned
that ITS will be used automatically to monitor information about the
condition of a driver and her vehicle and then, just as automatically, to
use this information to decide whether or not the driver or vehicle will
have access to transportation facilities. This concern is far from illu-
sory, since utilization of such an access control function is already part
of an application of ITS congestion management in Singapore. This
type of privacy concern focuses primarily on whether the individual
will be fully informed and allowed to voluntarily consent, or not, to
participation in ITS.
8. ITS can take over control of vehicle or transit operations by
means of intelligent automated systems, which substitute ITS
control for control by an individual.
Privacy concerns of this type focus on the capacity of ITS to
override individual control. People are concerned that ITS will take
from the individual control over her own movements and mobility.
Advanced ITS applications, such as Automated Highways, are ex-
pressly designed to transfer control over many vehicle operation func-
tions to automated intelligent systems. Individuals who prefer to
retain control over such functions sometimes describe this type of ITS
operation as interfering with their privacy, in the sense of overriding
individual choices, decisions and control.
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9. Government agencies can use ITS to collect, to manipulate
and to disclose information about individual travellers and
to control their travel by means of government-controlled
automated systems.
People are concerned that ITS will give government agencies
control over an important aspect of daily life. They fear that ITS will
endanger privacy by giving government too much power to manage
and control individual lives. Federal, state and local government
agencies are all feared in this regard. ITS is perceived as threatening
to shift the balance of power from the individual to the government, at
least with regard to transportation aspects of an individual's life. This
type of privacy concern was roughly equal in importance to the tenth
concern noted below. However, people older than forty years old
tended to mention the Watergate abuses of government agencies or the
loyalty checks of the McCarthy era and generally expressed greater
concern about misuse of ITS by government to invade people's pri-
vacy, than about misuse of ITS by private entities.
10. Private entities, especially large corporations, will use ITS
to collect, to manipulate and to disclose transportation
information about individuals and use ITS to take over
control of travel.
To the extent that a private ITS provider controls individual
travel information, transportation options and sometimes both, privacy
concerns arise because of the power the ITS provider would then have
over the iidividual. Historically, concerns about the power exercised
by large private-sector entities have, historically, sometimes been as
serious and as deeply felt as concerns about government power. This
type of privacy concern was roughly equal in importance to the ninth
concern noted above. However, people who were younger than forty
years old tended to be more concerned about private companies mis-
using ITS to invade privacy, than they were about government misuse
of ITS.
This list of privacy concerns is not presented as a scientific cata-
logue of privacy concerns about ITS and other transportation technol-
ogies of tomorrow. But it does suggest some general themes and
some areas in which ITS will need to design proper respect for privacy
into the very structure of ITS. Development of ITS architecture,
which is well under way, already includes consideration of privacy.31
31. IVHS Architecture Development Program Interim Status Report (Ap. 1994) and ITS
Architecture Development Program Phase I Summary Report (Nov. 1994).
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Deployment of ITS will need to put respect for privacy into ITS
practice.
Considered from yet a different standpoint, there are many polit-
ical and philosophical reasons why concerns about individual privacy
are likely to be raised about ITS. One reason for protecting privacy is
to prevent the individual from being overwhelmed by the larger soci-
ety of which the individual is a part. Privacy is often described as a
way to fence off the individual from unwanted attention on the part of
big business and big government - the composite threat personified by
George Orwell's Big Brother in the novel, 1984. When people react
to ITS as a "Big Brother" technology, that is a way of underscoring
concerns about the impact these transportation technologies could
have upon an individual vulnerable to being oppressed by a much
more powerful society.
However, not everyone agrees that individual privacy is desira-
ble. Some commentators and legal scholars reject the legal concept-of
privacy and both deride and attack it.32 Privacy is sometimes criti-
cized as class-based, offering little of interest or utility to the popula-
tion as a whole. Political viewpoints which place more importance on
the community or society than on its individual members generally
disapprove of privacy. Ruth Gavison has extensively explored this
problematic status of privacy among feminists.3 3 In addition to femi-
nists, others have objected to privacy as wrongheaded, literally with
the priorities of society and the individual upside down. For them,
privacy is fundamentally subversive of what they feel are more impor-
tant societal or group objectives. Inevitably controversial as a political
matter, privacy concerns insist on protecting the individual from the
power of the state and of society at large. Being concerned about
privacy is essential to the attitude of non-conformists and independ-
ent-minded individualists.
Because privacy also can become somewhat antisocial, policy
makers usually seek to balance privacy with other societal values,
such as social control, deterrence of anti-social behavior, and public
health and safety. In the ITS context, such competing values which
will be balanced with privacy concerns include highway safety (for
32. E.g., Catharine MacKinnon insists that "For women the measure of the intimacy has
been the measure of the oppression. This is why feminism has had to explode the private. This
is why feminism has seen the personal as the political. The private is public for those for whom
the personal is political. In this sense, for women there is no private, either normatively. or
empirically." CATHERmE A. MAcKmNoN, TOWARD A FEamnIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191
(1989).
33. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1992).
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example, keeping speeders, drunk drivers and unsafe vehicles off the
roads) and environmental quality (for example, alleviating air pollu-
tion by reducing traffic congestion).
IV. ITS CONCERNS ABOUT PRIVACY
ITS is concerned about privacy, and privacy laws in particular,
for at least three reasons. In the first place, recognition of privacy as a
value seems worthy of concern in designing ITS systems, because in
the long run public acceptance and use of ITS services will depend on
public confidence in the technology as not predatory or harmful.34
Respecting privacy fosters public confidence in ITS and will add to
the consumer appeal of ITS services. Second, taking account of pri-
vacy is mandated under the federal organic act which created the fed-
eral ITS program.3" Third, a variety of existing privacy laws will
constrain how ITS can be operated. Structuring ITS in ways which
avoid violating federal and state privacy laws will be important for an
ITS industry which will operate nationwide. In the United States, ITS
services will have to comply with a wide range of both federal and
state privacy laws.
Existing privacy laws which may potentially affect ITS are enor-
mously varied and dynamic. The nature of the privacy laws which
will apply to ITS will depend in part on where and by whom a particu-
lar ITS application is operated. Since ITS technologies will be created
and operated by private-sector entities, by government entities, and
also by public-private partnerships, almost every type of privacy law
is potentially applicable. 36 Both state and federal privacy laws will
apply to ITS, including constitutional privacy protections, many dif-
ferent privacy statutes and regulations, as well as common law tort
actions for invasion of privacy.
Legal conceptions of privacy are notoriously uncertain. Within
the universe of legal concepts, privacy laws often seem to behave like
the fractals in chaos theory - ever-changing in unpredictable but pat-
terned ways.37 Some years ago, Chief Justice Rhenquist described the
privacy cases decided by the United States Supreme Court as "defying
categorical description." 38 Professor Arthur R. Miller chose "A Thing
34. See discussion, supra at notes 28-31.
35. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 2189, § 6054.
36. The aspect of privacy law which deals with protection for intimate choices related to
such matters as childbearing is just about the only area of privacy law not potentially applicable
to one aspect or another of ITS. Privacy rights regarding these intimate choices are generally
associated with the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. See JAmEs GLmcr, CHAOS: MA,,NG A Naw Scamce (1987).
38. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
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of Threads and Patches" as the title of one of the chapters in his influ-
ential book, The Assault on Privacy.39 A federal judge once described
privacy law as like a "haystack in a hurricane."'  Privacy laws seem
to have this amorphous quality in part because privacy depends to
some extent on each person's expectations regarding respect for
her individual personality. Based on connotations of respect for indi-
viduality, privacy laws have developed through richly suggestive, but
hardly very precise, metaphors. Perhaps because privacy operates as
a value and a legal principle,4 ' privacy laws resist being fitted into any
fixed catalogue of legal rules and requirements. As a result, the pre-
cise interaction of changing and varied privacy laws with the dynamic
and multifaceted ITS technologies will be very difficult to predict.
What is certain is that ITS technologies and systems will have to com-
ply with a seemingly bewildering variety of both federal and state pri-
vacy laws.
Nevertheless, engineers and scientists who work with ITS
projects and policymakers who decide which ITS projects will be un-
dertaken need a framework of privacy laws to outline some logical
categories to guide selection and design of ITS plans and projects.
For example, a traffic engineer suggested preparation of a privacy law
chart for ITS operations which would look something like this:
Clearly legal Not clearly legal or illegal Clearly illegal
ITS development would certainly be simpler from a privacy stand-
point if most intelligent transportation technologies fit under the left
column, a few clearly rogue applications fit in the right column, with
nothing much left in the middle. Unfortunately, most privacy laws
place ITS squarely in the uncertain middle category.
Privacy laws are most likely to affect ITS by constraining how
ITS is managed and operated. ITS technologies42 do not appear to be
outlawed by existing privacy laws. Plans for ITS do not, for example,
include use of wiretaps or scanners, which are outlaw technologies
prohibited under the federal electronic surveillance statues. Rather,
because the "intelligent" part of ITS depends on information, most of
the privacy laws which will apply to ITS will focus on ITS communi-
cation functions and information use. In particular, privacy laws will
govern how ITS information is communicated from, to and about indi-
vidual drivers or travellers.
39. ARTmm R. Maimu, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169 (1971).
40. Ettore v. Philco Telev. Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).
41. See text, infra, at notes 12 -26.
42. See text, infra, at notes 6 - 11.
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Because federal and state privacy laws differ in applicability, fed-
eral and state privacy laws need to be considered separately. The na-
tion-wide reach of federal privacy laws (including constitutional
provisions, statutes and regulations), contrasts sharply with the more
limited territorial reach of state privacy laws (including state constitu-
tional provisions, state statutes and regulations, as well as common
law civil liability in tort for invasion of privacy), which apply within
the geographical boundaries of each jurisdiction. This difference in
applicability makes it sensible to discuss the federal privacy laws
which apply throughout the United States and then to turn to the much
greater variety of state privacy laws.
Federal Privacy Laws
Much of the federal constitutional privacy law potentially appli-
cable to ITS is derived from the federal constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. This federal constitutional pri-
vacy protection applies only to privacy invasions by federal, state or
local government, usually in a law enforcement context. This branch
of privacy law depends in part on whether the person objecting to a
search or seizure has an expectation of privacy which is reasonable.43
Law enforcement use of remote electronic tracking technology similar
to that which ITS will utilize has, for the most part, not been found to
be an unreasonable search or seizure under federal law.,,
In addition, constitutional privacy protection associated with
rights to liberty and rights to freedom in making personal choices
guaranteed under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution could affect ITS. Were public sector ITS applica-
tions to constrain transportation choices through demand management
strategies, this type of privacy concern might arise, despite the fact
that transportation choices are not at all intimate, in contrast to family
planning or healthcare choices which have been the focus of this
branch of privacy law. In a much more speculative area of constitu-
tional theory, were ITS to require people to give up privacy rights in
exchange for permission to use public highways, questions could arise
with regard to whether compulsory participation in ITS would impose
unconstitutional conditions.45
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
44. See Robert Weisberg, IVHS, Legal Privacy and the Legacy of Dr. Faustus, supra.
45. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1987) and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
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With regard to federal statutes designed to protect privacy, in
some ways the most important for ITS are the federal electronic sur-
veillance statutes, particularly the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986,41 as amended by the 1994 Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act.47 These statutes, which regulate the inter-
ception of wireless oral and electronic communications, including ITS
data transmissions, will generally protect ITS communications against
interception both by law enforcement and by eavesdroppers. Vehicle-
identifying time and place information, sometimes called a transmis-
sion record, continuously transmitted between a vehicle and an ITS
traffic management facility should be protected against unlawful inter-
ception under the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act.48 Although under these federal statutes a variety of ITS
information about individual ITS users may be used and disclosed by
an ITS provider "in the ordinary course of business," the 1994 amend-
ments are likely provide additional protection for the communications
privacy of ITS.
Because ITS will employ many different types of communica-
tions technologies in providing different types of ITS services, the ap-
plication to ITS of the federal electronic surveillance laws as amended
by the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act is
not completely certain. For example, the portions of the 1994 amend-
ments designed to apply to the relationships between telecommunica-
tions common carriers and law enforcement agencies seeking to
intercept digitized telecommunications probably will not apply to ITS.
ITS communications functions may utilize services provided by tele-
communications common carriers, but probably will not. Overall, the
1994 changes in federal electronic communications law should, for the
most part, enhance safeguards for the privacy of ITS users.
The law enforcement interceptions facilitated by the 1994
amendments are, however, invasive of privacy interests. The provi-
sions of the 1994 Act worthy of special note from an ITS perspective
appear in Title I. Law enforcement access to transactional data asso-
ciated with "on-line communication systems" now requires a warrant
under sections 201 and 207. But this warrant need not be based on
probable cause, but rather on "reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
102 HARv. L. REv. 1415 (1987). Professor Epstein further explored the parameters of unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrines in BARGaNG WrrH TE STATE (1993).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
47. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
48. Id. §§ 201, 107.
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information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation."'49 This law enforcement access authority is described
in the House Report as
an intermediate standard to protect on-line transactional records. It
is a standard higher than a subpoena, but not a probable cause war-
rant. The intent of raising the standard for access to transactional
data is to guard against "fishing expeditions" by law enforcement.
Under the intermediate standard, the court must find, based on law
enforcement's showing of facts, that there are specific and articul-
able grounds to believe that the records are relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation.
Law enforcement could still use a subpoena to obtain the
name, address, telephone toll billing records, and length of service
of a subscriber to or customer of such service and the types of
services the subscriber or customer utilized.50
These changes in federal electronic surveillance law on ITS will prob-
ably mean that the use of the intermediate-level warrant requirement
will apply to most law enforcement access to most ITS vehicle sur-
veillance data.
In addition to law enforcement interceptions, which are the pri-
mary focus of the 1994 legislation, other aspects of the Communica-
tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act will more generally affect
privacy in a positive fashion. According to the House Report,
The legislation also expands privacy and security protection
for telephone and computer communications. The protections of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 are extended
to cordless phones and certain data communications transmitted by
radio. In addition, the bill increases the protection for transactional
data on electronic communications services by requiring law en-
forcement to obtain a court order for access to electronic mail ad-
dressing information.
The bill further protects privacy by requiring the systems of
telecommunications carriers to protect communications not author-
ized to be intercepted and by restricting the ability of law enforce-
ment to use pen register devices for tracking purposes or for
obtaining transactional information. Finally, the bill improves the
privacy of mobile phones by expanding criminal penalties for using
certain devices to steal mobile phone service.51
Prominent among the purposes underlying the legislation, according to
the House Report, are concerns about "protecting the privacy of com-
49. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 § 207 (1994), amending 18 U.S.C. 2703(d).
50. H.R. REP. No. 827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 31-32 (1994).
51. H.R. REP. No. 827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1994).
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munications" and avoiding "impeding the introduction of new tech-
nologies, features, and services. 52
The 1994 amendments also provide new protection against inter-
ception of radio portions of a cordless telephone communication be-
tween the handset and the base unit and impose a $500 penalty for
intentionally intercepting cordless telephone communications.53
Although ITS does not, at least at present, generally employ cordless
telephones, the Congressional commitment to the privacy of short-dis-
tance radio communications expressed in the 1994 amendments may
suggest potential support for similar protections for the short-distance
radio communications which are frequently used in ITS. In general,
radio-based communications are included among "electronic commu-
nications" which the 1994 amendments protect against eavesdrop-
ping.54 The House Report notes that these provisions "provide
protection for all forms of electronic communications, including data,
even when they may be transmitted by radio. '55 In addition, the 1994
amendments extend protection to data and communications "en-
crypted or transmitted using modulation techniques the essential pa-
rameters of which have been withheld from the public with the
intention of preserving the privacy of such communications .... 56
These provisions may affect the privacy ramifications of particular
communications media and encryption strategies which may be used
by ITS applications. The 1994 amendments also add both scanning
receivers and "hardware or software used for altering or modifying
telecommunications instruments to obtain unauthorized access to tele-
communications services . . ." to the list of prohibited electronic
eavesdropping devices.57 This provision designed to protect personal
privacy will also safeguard important rights of ITS providers and users
to proprietary data.
Other federal privacy statutes which may apply to certain aspects
of ITS are concerned with consumer credit and financial matters.
These statutes include the Right to Financial Privacy Act,51 the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 59 the Fair Credit Billing Act60 and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.61 These federal consumer privacy statutes
52. H.RL REP. No. 827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1994).
53. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 § 202 (1994).
54. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 §§ 203, 204 (1994).
55. H.R. REp. No. 827, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 31 (1994).
56. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 § 204 (1994).
57. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 § 206 (1994).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 3401.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1681, regs. at 16 C.F.R. § 600.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1666.
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1692.
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are designed to prevent misuse of particular types of personal informa-
tion. To the extent that consumer credit and financial information is
incorporated into particular ITS applications, such as toll-collection or
toll-billing functions, these federal statutes may apply. The Drivers'
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, which was part of the 1994 Crime
Bill62 will not directly apply to ITS unless ITS records become part of
state motor vehicle and driver licensing records. But this statute may
make it more difficult to link ITS information attached to Vehicle
Identification Numbers with identifiable individuals.
At present, it does not appear likely that federal agencies will
operate ITS or collect or maintain ITS data regarding individuals. If,
in the future, ITS were to be operated by federal agencies, two addi-
tional federal privacy statutes might apply to ITS: the Privacy Act and
the Freedom of Information Act. The Freedom of Information Act, or
FOIA,63 would probably require public disclosure of most ITS infor-
mation held by federal agencies, unless the interference with personal
privacy caused by the disclosure were found to be clearly unwar-
ranted. Keeping in mind that the application of this and other FOIA
exemptions tends to be very context-specific, it seems unlikely that
ITS transportation information would always be withheld from disclo-
sure.r If ITS information about individuals were collected by a fed-
eral agency, the Privacy Act of 197411 would generally restrict
disclosure and use of personal ITS data collected by federal agencies
to those purposes for which the information was originally collected.
Moreover, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of
1988,66 would regulate federal data matching programs were they to
make use of ITS information. At present, no such matching of ITS
data with data held by various federal agencies has been proposed.
Were ITS data to become part of individual information databases
held by federal agencies, from the Internal Revenue Service to the
Department of Veterans Affairs, concerns about privacy with regard to
this ITS information would rise sharply. Moreover, because the
62. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2094 (1994).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
64. See U.S. Dept of Defense v. F.L.R.A., 114 S. Ct.. 1006 (1994). In this Freedom of
Information Act case, the United States Supreme Court split sharply over whether disclosure of
the names and addresses of federal employees who were not labor union members to union
organizers would invade privacy protected under the FOIA. Justice Thomas' opinion for the
court found that release of federal employees' home addresses to labor union organizers would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. He wrote: "An individual's interest in
controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply
because that information may be available to the public in some form." Id. at 1015.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
66. These provisions are also found at 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
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FOIA, and to a lesser extent the Privacy Act, are frequently followed
in state court interpretations of state public records and privacy laws,
the federal FOIA, and other federal statutes affecting privacy, are
likely to provide persuasive precedent when state courts interpret simi-
lar state privacy and public records statutes.
State Privacy Laws
In contrast to federal privacy laws which apply uniformly
throughout the United States, state privacy law is both highly differen-
tiated on a state-by-state basis and more intensive in its regulation of
private sector privacy invasions, as well as government agency intru-
sions. Many different types of state laws will govern the handling of
information about individuals collected by ITS operations, whether
that collection is accomplished by state or local agencies or by private
sector transportation, financial service or credit reporting
organizations.
Overall, state privacy laws are characterized by remarkable vol-
ume and variety. The map at the end of the Appendix to this article
illustrates some general estimates of the varying intensities of privacy
laws across the United States. The five tables which precede the map
summarize some of what the Santa Clara Privacy and ITS Legal Re-
search Project found in looking at five groups of twenty-five different
types of state privacy laws which could affect the deployment of ITS.
Types of state privacy laws potentially applicable to ITS include state
constitutional privacy laws, state statutory privacy laws and also state
common law privacy torts. Privacy law often applies in overlays, with
federal law applicable in all states and then various patterns of state
privacy laws providing additional privacy protections. The privacy
laws which govern electronic surveillance are a good illustration of
this overlay pattern in which several layers of state constitutional and
statutory privacy law often operate simultaneously with federal consti-
tutional privacy provisions and federal privacy statutes.
State constitutional provisions guaranteeing privacy will present
a distinct privacy challenge for ITS in the handful of states where state
constitutions specifically guarantee a right of privacy. 67 These state
constitutional privacy guarantees raise interesting legal questions be-
cause they generally signal the likelihood of more intense privacy
protection in these states. At present, there are no state court interpre-
tations of state constitutional privacy guarantees in the ITS context.
67. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Montana, South Carolina and West Virginia.
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One potentially analogous type of public activity in which privacy
rights have been protected as a matter of state constitutional privacy
law is trash disposal. Although the United States Supreme Court does
not recognize privacy rights in trash left on the curbside to be removed
by refuse collectors, several state supreme courts have protected such
privacy rights as a matter of state constitutional privacy law. 68 If this
view was extended to tailpipe emissions from vehicles, such an inter-
pretation might make it difficult to operate the proposed ITS emis-
sions testing and mitigation user service. When emissions testing ITS
services target individual drivers and vehicles for enforcement of envi-
ronmental standards,69 such testing would be particularly susceptible
to challenge as an invasion of privacy.70 Unless law enforcement ap-
plications of ITS are on a state-by-state basis or are as privacy-protec-
tive as the most restrictive states, such differential rulings among the
states may stand in the way of uniform operation of an ITS system
nationwide. The fact that in some states,71 state constitutional privacy
guarantees apply to both the private sector, as well as the public sec-
tor, means that state constitutional privacy guarantees in those states
will constrain privately operated ITS, as well as publicly operated ITS.
Virtually every state constitution also specifically prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures. However, various state courts
around the country have expressed many different views regarding the
types of privacy expectations which should be protected as reasonable.
Variation in state court views about the reasonableness of privacy ex-
pectations is particularly pronounced with regard to vehicles. For ex-
ample, although law enforcement use of electronic vehicle tracking
technology has generally not been found to be an unreasonable search
or seizure under federal law, some state courts have found law en-
forcement use of electronic beeper surveillance to be a violation of
reasonable expectations of privacy protected under state constitutions.
In other states, courts have specifically held that this same electronic
tracking technology does not invade privacy. Privacy laws regarding
electronic vehicle tracking illustrate how context-sensitive and geo-
graphically varied state privacy law can be.
68. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). The states which have adopted a con-
trary view as a matter of state constitutional law are California, Hawaii, New Jersey, Washington
and perhaps Indiana, where the intermediate appellate courts are divided on the issue.
69. E.g., California and Arizona are experimenting with ITS programs involving remote
infra-red monitoring of tailpipe emissions from "gross polluters."
70. The Supreme Court of Washington has already extended the analogy from trash
searches to police use of remote infra-red heat detection to discover an indoor marijuana-grow-
ing operation. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
71. Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois and Louisiana.
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All states and the District of Columbia have adopted public
records acts, typically similar to the federal Freedom of Information
Act. These statutes pose at least fifty-one different privacy challenges
to operation of public-sector ITS by state and local government enti-
ties. A number of these open public records laws contain privacy ex-
emptions. But none of these exemptions for private or confidential
information appears to specifically require nondisclosure of ITS infor-
mation about individuals. Some state agencies may treat some ITS
information regarding individuals with some degree of confidentiality.
But, since none of the state public records laws clearly provides for
confidentiality of ITS information, ITS users are likely to be justifia-
bly concerned about the privacy of information about them collected
by public sector ITS operations. Unless state public records statutes
are amended to exempt ITS information from disclosure, the ready
availability of information about individuals contained in ITS systems
is likely to pose serious privacy problems for publicly operated ITS.72
The nature of the information about individuals collected by ITS is
generally not very intimate. It will consist mostly of an individual's
requests for directions and trip reports reflecting how and when the
individual has moved from place to place on roadways or public
transit systems. The fact that even such mundane information can
sometimes be revealing, destructive, or both with regard to an individ-
ual,7" may cause potential ITS users to prefer not to use ITS if the
result is that such information becomes public, or available to anyone
who asks for it.
The courts of most states recognize damage actions for invasion
of privacy. Generally, privacy damage actions under state common
law reflect the four categories outlined in the Restatement, Second, of
Torts, Sections 652A - 6521: appropriation of name or likeness, pres-
entation of a person in a false light, intrusion on seclusion, and public
disclosure of private facts. Exactly how various state courts will apply
these common law tort doctrines to the many different ITS applica-
tions is difficult to predict, since there is no reported court decision
regarding tort liability for invasion of privacy in a context similar to
ITS. As a general matter, tort liability for invasion of privacy requires
intentional conduct on the part of the defendant. A few states ex-
pressly disapprove negligence as a basis for privacy tort liability.
72. One reflection of widespread concern about the types of information which may be
contained in some ITS systems is the recently enacted Drivers' Privacy Protection Act supra at
note 62, which will at least to some degree restrict the availability of drivers license and motor
vehicle registration records maintained by the states. But this statute does not specificaily ad-
dress ITS or the types of information which ITS will collect.
73. See United States Dept. of Defense v. F.L.R.A., 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994).
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Moreover, in those states which require that the conduct infringing
privacy be willful or outrageous, ITS routine operations are unlikely to
result in tort liability for invasion of privacy. To the extent that ITS is
operated by state or local government agencies, the potential for suc-
cessful common law privacy damage actions against public sector ITS
agencies may well also be limited by sovereign immunity. Neverthe-
less, whether or not privacy litigation ultimately results in damage lia-
bility, the risk of costly litigation over invasion of privacy will likely
constrain the activities of ITS operators.
This brief overview of federal and state privacy laws potentially
applicable to ITS can only suggest the contours of a geographically
diverse and complicated body of many different types and sources of
privacy law.74 Overall, ITS is likely to benefit from the effects of
these various privacy laws in at least three ways. First, privacy law
will promote ITS efficiency. The purpose of ITS is not to collect per-
sonal information about individuals. To the extent that privacy laws
constrain ITS collection and use of personal information, privacy laws
will assist ITS in keeping in focus the ITS goals of improving safety,
reducing congestion, enhancing mobility, minimizing environmental
impacts, saving energy and promoting economic productivity. Sec-
ond, some of the privacy laws will reinforce protection for the integ-
rity and security of ITS computer hardware, software and data by
preventing and punishing interferences with personal information held
by ITS computer operations. Third, compliance with these privacy
laws should, by demonstrating respect for individual privacy, increase
the confidence of ITS users in ITS as a valuable technology the bene-
fits of which can be enjoyed without sacrificing individual privacy.
V. SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY
Safeguarding privacy is certain to be important if ITS is to be
accepted in the United States. Exactly how to safeguard privacy is
much less clear. Three general types of privacy safeguards can help
ITS properly respect individual privacy: technological safeguards, in-
dustry standards and legal requirements. The best privacy strategy for
ITS will be to adopt combinations of these privacy safeguards, with
multiple types of privacy protections and mechanisms to assure that
privacy is respected by the various types of ITS applications which
will operate in different parts of the United States. The diversity of
existing privacy laws around the United States suggests that there will
74. More detail is provided in the tables in the Appendix to this article.
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be many types and degrees of concerns about privacy as ITS is
deployed in various localities.
Technological Privacy Safeguards
Common sense suggests that, since individual people are at the
center of privacy, the best safeguard for privacy would be to structure
ITS technologies so that ITS nowhere identifies individuals. It is at
least theoretically possible to protect privacy by designing ITS so that
it does not contain private information about individuals at all. In
such an arrangement, ITS applications would have general, non-indi-
vidualized, traffic management functions, such as traffic flow mea-
surements. ITS would also be able to monitor ambient air standards.
But ITS would lack the technical capacity to identify individuals. As
a result, privacy would be protected by keeping the individual person
out of the ITS information loop. Since ITS would not recognize,
much less keep track of, individuals, privacy concerns would fade into
the background.75
Many existing ITS operations are already non-individualized in
that they do not deal with information about identified individuals ex-
cept perhaps for billing purposes. For example, toll collection tech-
nologies frequently use numeric identifiers such as a vehicle
registration number or Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), rather
than an individual's name, social security number, or driver's license
number. Nevertheless, since most states have allowed wide-open pub-
lic access to vehicle registration records which link a vehicle's regis-
tration number with the name and address of the vehicle's owner, it
has been relatively simple, not to mention cheap and perfectly legal, to
associate a vehicle with a person or vice-versa. The Drivers' Privacy
Protection Act of 1994 will make it only slightly more difficult to
connect vehicle registration numbers with individuals.
Several important difficulties would result from protecting pri-
vacy by completely eliminating the individual. To begin with, such an
approach to protecting individual privacy would result in ITS disre-
garding the very individual person who is at the core of why people
care about privacy. In addition to this dehumanizing factor, eliminat-
ing the capacity of ITS to identify individual transportation users may
also eliminate many of the benefits of some ITS user services. Rather
than eliminating the individual, minimizing collection of information
about individuals might be a better technical strategy to protect indi-
1 75. Concerns about individual choice and consent to participation in ITS might still re-
main, but would be significantly reduced.
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vidual privacy and should also be cost-effective in reducing ITS infra-
structure costs.
To the extent that ITS does deal with at least some information
related to individuals, certain technical privacy safeguards, particu-
larly for ITS communications, will be essential tools for protecting the
privacy of ITS users. That is why data security techniques and tech-
nologies, such as encryption, designed to secure the privacy of com-
munications will be important technical safeguards for the privacy of
ITS users. Other technical strategies, such as automatic data destruc-
tion, non-transferability of information about individuals for secon-
dary and tertiary uses, and audit trails reflecting every access to ITS
data about individuals, are additional types of technical privacy safe-
guards. These technical mechanisms for privacy protection might
well be required as a matter of industry policy or imposed as legal
requirements.
However, technical strategies for safeguarding privacy in ITS
raise a number of practical concerns. Consider, for example, an ITS
application designed for privacy reasons to operate solely on the basis
of user addresses which are both randomly assigned and subject to
frequent, random change. In this ITS application toll and transit oper-
ations are equipped to remotely deduct vehicle toll charges from
"smart" stored-value devices with both "read" and "write" capabili-
ties. Each device is identified only by random transient addresses and
is under the sole control of the ITS user. The memory of the smart
stored-value device provides the ITS user with detailed records of all
of her toll charges and transit fares. But the central ITS system man-
ager, with the capacity only of deducting charges from randomly iden-
tified user addresses, can neither collect nor store information about
identifiable ITS users or vehicles. Specific vehicles or transit riders
identified in travelling from one place to another (for example in cal-
culating tolls or fares based on distance travelled) are only transitorily
identifiable and then only by the randomly assigned and changeable
address of the "smart" stored value device. The ITS system has no
technical capacity for centralized ITS retention of even non-individu-
ally-identified trip reports. Since the individual ITS user has sole con-
trol over her individual travel data, she has the choice whether to share
it with others or not.
Such an ITS system could be designed to restrict the technical
capacity of ITS to invade privacy by rendering the ITS infrastructure
incapable of collecting, much less retaining, vehicle-specific or travel-
ler-specific data in a form which could be associated with any individ-
ual ITS user. The ITS equipment costs to the individual user would be
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likely to be relatively high in such a system. On the other hand, the
infrastructure cost of a limited central ITS management system would
be less than the cost of similar central ITS systems with added techni-
cal functions designed to collect, store and manipulate information
about individuals. The practical privacy provided by such an ITS sys-
tem would depend on the physical and electronic security of the indi-
vidual's "smart" stored-value device.
Industry Standards
In some ways the most appealing of the potential strategies for
protecting privacy in ITS is for the ITS industry voluntarily to adopt
and to follow privacy principles and standards. In the first part of this
issue, Congressman Mineta suggests such an approach in urging adop-
tion of fair information practices through voluntary industry action.
Moreover, industry adoption of effective privacy standards might
avoid or limit the necessity of imposing privacy requirements by legal
mandate. When technologies are relatively new and unfamiliar, as is
the case with ITS, industry privacy principles are particularly impor-
tant in fostering consumer confidence.76 Since safeguarding privacy
in ITS operations will require proper training of ITS personnel to re-
spect the privacy of ITS users and to respond appropriately to privacy
concerns, standards and guidelines for effective privacy-protective ITS
practices will be essential. The quality of the ITS industry response in
terms of privacy principles and standards will be an early and impor-
tant measure of this new industry's commitment to the interests of the
individual ITS user. To the extent that ITS industry privacy standards
fall short of the respect for privacy potential ITS users expect and
desire, ITS will likely be avoided by potential users and subjected to
more restrictive legal safeguards.
Legal Safeguards for Privacy
Even if ITS adopts both excellent technical safeguards and effec-
tive industry standards, it is likely that protection for privacy in ITS
will also require legal safeguards. Legal requirements mandating ITS
privacy safeguards assist in fostering public confidence that ITS in-
dustry standards and technical strategies are, in actuality, being fol-
lowed. Moreover, privacy laws will also provide added assurance
that, if ITS interferes with privacy, legal redress is available. The pre-
76. ITS-America, an ITS industry organization which is also an authorized advisory com-
mittee to the Federal Highway Administration, has recognized the importance of ITS privacy
principles. The organization is in the process of developing privacy principles for adoption by
this industry group.
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cise contours of legal safeguards for privacy in ITS will be affected by
a number of important policy choices, both with regard to ITS opera-
tions and with regard to types of privacy protections. In general, there
are two very different types of choices regarding legal safeguards for
privacy in ITS. First, there are the choices among appropriate legal
mechanisms for imposing privacy safeguards. Second, there are
choices about the substantive nature of the privacy requirements
which should be imposed by law.
With regard to legal mechanisms for imposing privacy safe-
guards, such protections can be provided at the federal state and local
levels. They can be enacted in statutes or promulgated in administra-
tive regulations. Legal privacy safeguards can be enforced by means
of administrative sanctions, criminal penalties, civil liability, licensing
standards for ITS providers and operators, procurement and con-
tracting requirements, and various other regulatory enforcement mech-
anisms. Statutes may also authorize individuals to vindicate their own
privacy interests by means of civil actions for invasion of privacy. In
fact, statutory damage actions for invasion of privacy by ITS might
well be enacted to substitute for the uncertainties of potential common
law tort liability. However, for those concerned about privacy, civil
liability may be problematic because, although damages may deter
future privacy invasions, civil liability for invasion of privacy pro-
vides only after-the-fact compensation and exacts a price in terms of
further publicity with regard to private matters.
Which level or levels of government should impose legal safe-
guards for privacy in ITS depends in part on the extent to which ITS is
structured as a uniform national system, as opposed to a non-uniform,
decentralized pattern of diverse operations varying from state to state
and location to location around the United States. Current plans for
ITS contemplate an interoperable nationwide system. If a unified na-
tional ITS system remains a high priority, then it may be necessary for
the federal government, either through Congressional enactment or
through promulgation of administrative regulations, to set national pri-
vacy standards for ITS which could by statute expressly preempt state
privacy laws regulating ITS privacy. In some ways such preemptive
federal privacy laws would provide the widest and most uniform reach
of privacy protection wherever ITS operates in the United States.
However, such a preemptive approach would be controversial unless
the federal standards were at least as protective of privacy as the most
privacy-protective of the state laws."
77. This issue regarding preemption of state privacy laws was a major factor preventing
passage of proposed changes to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act during the 103d Congress.
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In the absence of preemptive federal privacy standards for ITS,
state legislatures may well adopt specific privacy laws or standards
applicable to ITS operations within their borders. Credit card opera-
tions are already subject to such specific legislation. Hawaii78 and
California79 have for example, enacted state law privacy regulations
for credit card operations which might be used as models for ITS pri-
vacy law regulations. Moreover, in some states, state public utility
regulatory agencies may consider privacy regulations in the course of
developing licensing standards or permit criteria for some aspects of
ITS, such as toll roads and bridges. Localities may also adopt ordi-
nances requiring local transportation authorities to require ITS opera-
tions within their local boundaries to safeguard privacy in various
ways. Such varying state and perhaps local ITS privacy requirements
may make operation of standardized ITS technologies and a nationally
unified, interoperable ITS deployment more difficult. To the extent
that ITS policymakers place a high priority on uniform interstate ITS
operations, uniformity in state ITS privacy protections and standards
will also be a high priority.
80
Substantively, legal privacy safeguards can encompass many
types of legal requirements in responding to various types of privacy
concerns about ITS discussed throughout this article. At a minimum,
ITS should emphasize individual choice and control over ITS. This
type of privacy safeguard would come from legal requirements that
iTS users be notified about ITS operations affecting privacy and be
given a clear choice whether or not to participate in ITS. Informed
and realistic choices regarding ITS will also enhance the sense of per-
sonal autonomy which is a part of privacy. However, informing the
general public about each ITS application and securing truly informed
An example of non-preemptive federal law regarding privacy can be found in the federal elec-
tronic surveillance laws which have for many years set minimum privacy standards without
generally preempting state laws more protective of communications privacy.
78. HAw. REv. STAT. § 708-8105, which prohibits sales of lists of credit card holders.
79. CAL. CrvA CODE § 1748.12. This state statute requires that "If the credit card issuer
discloses marketing information concerning a cardholder to any person, the credit card issuer
shall provide a written notice to the cardholder that clearly and conspicuously describes the
cardholder's right to prohibit the disclosure to marketers of goods of marketing information
concerning the cardholder which discloses the cardholder's identity.' CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1748.12(c).
80. A degree of uniformity among the states with regard to ITS privacy safeguards might
be facilitated by adoption of uniform state laws. Unfortunately, the fact that only eleven states
have adopted the 1955 Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-theft Act over al-
most four decades is some evidence that the drafting of a uniform law in the surface transporta-
tion area may not necessarily result in actual uniformity of privacy laws among the states.
Model ITS privacy legislation is another possibility. But states and localities would have to be
persuaded to adopt such model laws or codes in identical or nearly identical form.
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consent to participation in it, is likely to be an especially challenging
task. As is the case with regard to many technologies, ITS is infested
with nearly impenetrable and constantly changing acronyms, not to
mention obscure technical language, which are frequently understand-
able only to the most intrepid technophile. Making ITS clear to the
ordinary people who will use ITS services will be vital for privacy
protection as well as important for acceptance of ITS products and
services. The user services approach taken in the National Program
Plan for ITS is a wise step in this direction. But average consumers,
drivers and transit riders are likely to have significant difficulty figur-
ing out which bundle of the 29 user services is involved in a particular
ITS application they might want to consider. Without clear and un-
derstandable information, informed consent is not possible. Without
informed consent, safeguarding the privacy of individuals using ITS
will not occur.. Requiring ITS operators to provide each ITS consumer
with what is in effect a privacy impact analysis before the consumer
decides to use an ITS service would be a particularly effective legal
safeguard for privacy in ITS.
Privacy laws may also require that all ITS providers first estab-
lish the need for individually identifiable information about ITS users
and then publish privacy statements describing the personal informa-
tion which the ITS system intends to collect, the reasons for collecting
it, how the information will be used and how long it will be kept.
Privacy laws may also establish a legal right on the part of each ITS
user to access all information about herself collected by ITS providers,
as well as the identities of everyone requesting or receiving personal
information about her from an ITS system. Privacy laws may further
require destruction of individually identifiable information, once the
described need for it is satisfied, and, in any event, after the passage of
a short specified period of time. Privacy laws could also prohibit
compilation by ITS of individual travel profiles and travel histories
without the consent of the person involved.
Unless state open records statutes contain clear exemptions for
ITS information about individuals, public agencies operating ITS will
be required to disclose information about ITS users. As a result, dis-
closure exemptions for ITS information under the open records stat-
utes in every state and the District of Columbia will need to be enacted
to prevent disclosure of ITS information about individuals collected
by publicly operated ITS applications. An even better legal protection
for the privacy of individuals who use ITS would be legislation pro-
viding that all ITS information regarding individuals is confidential
and cannot legally be disclosed or used for non-ITS purposes without
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the consent of the individual or a court order, whether ITS is operated
by government agencies, private companies or public-private
partnerships.
Warrant requirements for law enforcement access to ITS infor-
mation about individuals will also be an important issue for ITS pri-
vacy law safeguards to address. Law enforcement access to most ITS
communications and transaction information relating to individuals al-
ready generally requires some type of judicial warrant. A probable
cause standard for such judicial warrants would provide better privacy
protection than the relevant-to-a-criminal-investigation standard speci-
fied under the 1994 amendments to the federal electronic surveillance
statutes. Moreover, broader legal requirements for judicial warrants
based on probable cause before any type of ITS information is ac-
cessed by law enforcement agencies and for notification of access to
the individual involved, would offer even better privacy protection.
One aspect of ITS which may affect the feasibility and cost of
legal privacy safeguards is whether individually identifiable informa-
tion about people who use ITS is separated from other ITS informa-
tion so that special legal requirements and restrictions can apply.
Such separation could be required by law or simply part of the struc-
ture of ITS. It would be easier for ITS managers to comply with legal
privacy safeguards, such as requirements that individually identifiable
information cannot be disclosed by an ITS provider without the prior,
informed written consent of the individual who is the subject of the
information, if individually identifiable information were maintained
in a dedicated system or separated from other ITS information in some
way. However, in the last analysis, even with multiple privacy laws,
industry standards and legally mandated technical safeguards, it will
not be possible to perfectly protect privacy once ITS is woven into the
surface transportation infrastructure.
VI. CONCLUSION
No technological privacy fix, nor industry privacy standard, nor
legal requirement that privacy must be respected, will completely an-
swer privacy concerns about ITS. Policymakers considering what to
do about privacy and ITS will likely seek to balance privacy against
other individual and societal interests in deciding how to respond to
privacy concerns. The papers from the Santa Clara Symposium pub-
lished elsewhere in this issue consider both the privacy concerns and
some appropriate responses. As ITS develops into a technological
web of information and communication systems tieing together sur-
face transportation infrastructure in the United States, many choices
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about safeguards for privacy in the transportation systems of to-
morrow will require further exploration. The simple idea that the fu-
ture of ITS depends in no small part on proper respect for the privacy
of ITS users is a starting point from which to begin to understand
some of the relationships which bind together ITS and privacy. Insis-
tence on respect for individuality and personal choice will be among
the great benefits which privacy and privacy law will contribute to the
successful development and operation of ITS.
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Appendix
Table A State Constitutional Privacy Provisions
Potentially Applicable to ITS
Table B State Surveillance Law Potentially
Applicable to ITS
Table C State Statutes Affecting Privacy in
Government Information Systems
Potentially Applicable to ITS
Table D State Statutes Regulating Private Sector
Interferences with Privacy Potentially
Applicable to ITS
Table E Invasion of Privacy Damage Actions
Potentially Applicable to ITS
Map Relative Intensity of Privacy Laws
Potentially Applicable to ITS
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Table A
State Constitutional Privacy Provisions Potentially Applicable to ITS
Express Implied SEARCH AND SEIZURE
state Privacy Privacy
Guarantee Right Restriction Doctrine Doctrine-
Alabama Yes Follows Follows
Alaska Yes Yes Yes o..U Follows
Arizona Yes Yes Follows Follows
Arkansas Yes Yes Follows Follows
California Yes Yes Follows Follows
Colorado Yes Follows Follows
Conneccut Yes Follows Follows
Delaware Yes Follows Follows
District of Columbia Yes Follows Follows
Florida Yes Yes Follows Follows
Georgia Yes Follows Follows
Hawali Yes Yes Yes Follows Follows
Idaho Yes Follows Follows
Illinois Yes Yes Follows Follows
Indiana Yes Follows Follows
Iowa Perhaps Yes Follows Follows
Kansas Yes Follows Follows
Kentucky Yes Follows Follows
EM.-M4OK
Louisiana Yes Yes Follows Follows
Maine Yes Follows Follows
Maryland Yes Follows Follows
Massachusetts Yes Follows Follows
Michigan Yes Follows Follows
[Innesota Yes Follows Follows
Indicates state constitutional privacy rights against non-governmental Interferences with privacy,
as well as invasions of privacy by govemment
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Table A Cont. - State Constitutional Privacy Provisions Potentially Applicable
to ITS
Express Implied SEARCH AND SEIZURE
State Privacy Privacy
Guarantee Right Restriction Plain View Open FieldsDoctrne Doctrine
MsssppI Yes Follows
Missouri Yes Follows Follows
Montana Yes Yes Follos Follows
Nebraska Yes Follows Follows
Nevada Yes Follows Follows
New Hampshire Yes Yes Follows Follows
New Jersey Yes Yes Follows Follows
New Mexico Yes Follows Follows
NewYork Yes Follows Follows
North Carolina Yes Follows Follows
North Dakota Yes Follows Follows
Ohio Yes Follows Follows
Oklahoma Yes Follows Follows
e CK
Oregon Yes Follows Follows
Pennsylvania Yes Follows Follows
Rhode Island Yes Follows Follows
South Carolina Yes Yes Follows
South Dakota Yes Follows Follows
Tennessee Yes Follows Limited
Texas Yes Follows Follows
Utah Yes ULmited Follows
Vermont Yes Follows Follows
Virgina Yes Follows Follows
Washington Yes Follows Follows
West Virgina Yes Yes Follows Follows
Wisconsin Yes Follows Follows
Wyoming Yes Follows Follows
Indicates state constitrtional privacy rights against non-govemmental interferences with privacy,
as well as Invasions of privacy by govemment
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Table B
State Surveillance Laws Potentially Applicable to ITS
Consti- Search & Electronlc Vehicle Employee
State tutional Seizure Surveillance Searches & Monitoring
Restriction Statute Statute Seizures Restrictions
Alabama Yes Yes
TracIft OK
Alaska Yes Yes Yes Vehile aderlorn Perhaps
Twjn OK or reduced p'racy
Arizona Yes Yes DUl roadblocks OK
Infrured OK
Arkansas Yes Yes
California Yes Yes
Tracing OK
Colorado Yes Yes
Connecticut Yes Yes Restricted Certa areas
protected
Delaware Yes Yes- Ect mployee
0______ 5M of Rights
DistrictofColumbla us Emploe
CoBathtio 81 of Rights
Florida Yes Yes
Tracft OK
Georgia Yes Yes
Hawai Yes Yes- TracwY Certain area,
requtesvwrrant proected
Idaho Yes Yes
Illinois Yes Yes
Indiana Yes Yes Vehf dte drro no
errdoddv
Iowa Yes Yes
Kansas Yes Yes - rjud,, Vchtte coderfr r
htcogah or reduced irebacy
Kentucky Yes Yes - TracIdan Vehkle eaderl no
OK Ifconsent or reduced peacy
Louisiana Yes Yes DWI roadblock Is a
Sciure
Maine Yes Yes EuteeiorViN Substarce
_LspecteOK abuse testg
PRIVACY & INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION
Table B Cont. - State Surveillance Laws Potentially Applicable to ITS
Consti- Search Electronic Vehicle Employee
State tutlonal & Surveillance Searches & Monitoring
Restriction Seizure Statute Seizures Restrictions
Statute
Maryland Yes Yes
Massachusetts Yes Ye s  Vecoe edelr noor educed privacy
Michigan Yes Yes VIN Ispectiorot Monlorn work
a search ras pearated
Minnesota Yes Yes- T1 Vehcle eoder no
~n.rr or reduced privacy
Mississippi Yes Yes Vehce eaterior e
orredluced privacy
Missouri Yes 
Yes
Montana Yes Yes Substance
abuse tiani
Nebraska Yes Yes s Yes
Nevada Yes Yes
New Hampshire Yes Yes Car detentuon IsSeizure
New Jersey Yes Yes Veh5cre e dr no
or reduced privacy
New Mexdco Yes VIN inspection Is Yes
not a search
NewYork Yes Yes Veicle ederl no Yes
Tracidag OK or reduced privacy
North Carolina Yes Yes
North Dakota Yes
Ohio Yes Yes Vehce e)darr no
or reduced privacy
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes
Trac"ng OK
Oregon Yes Yes Vehicl ealerler no
or reduced privacy
Pennsylvania Yes Yes - rs CK Vehicle e3derior n
__ _vots or reduced privacy
Rhode Isand Yes Yes OU roadhiocls
invade privacy
South Carolina Yes Yes __________
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Table B Cont. - State Surveillance Laws Potentially Applicable to ITS
Constt- Search Electronic Vehicle Employee
State tutional & Surveillance Searches & Monitoring
Restriction Seizure Statute Seizures Restrictions
Statute
South Dakota Yes IR&..
Tennessee Yes
Texas Yes Vehkte deder no
or reduced pr-,acy
Utah Yes Yes Vehde ederor no
v. .. ,c- oK af reduced prtcy
Vermont Yes Yes VehW euerlor no
r reduced prvacy
VirgInia Yes Yes Vedc$e elerWl no
or reduced prvacy
Washington Yes Yes- O<ou. VePt.e stops OK
West V1:ginia Yes Yes VehlJe weror no
Of reduced priacy
Wisconsin Yes Yes
Wyoming Yes Yes -
TrwoiV OK
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Table C
State Statutes Affecting Privacy in Government Information Systems
Potentially Applicable to ITS
PUBuc RECORDS Vehicle & Vehicle ID PRIVACY
State Statutory Privacy Driver Number ACT
Requirement Exemption Records Registration
Alabama Open Yes
Alaska Open Yes Open Yes Yes
Arizona Open Yes Open Yes
Arkansas Open Yes Open Yes
California Open Yes Restricted Yes Yes
Colorado Open Yes - no use Yes
for soQd'tabon
Connecticut Open Yes Open Yes
Delarare Open Yes Restricted Yes
District of Columbia Open Yes op.
Florida Open Yes Open Yes Yes
Georgia Open Yes confidentia Yes
Hawal Open Yes Traffto Yes Yes
offenses open
Idaho Open Yes Yes Yes
No ealet of
____ __ _ _____ ma~hg tof
Illinois Open Yes Restricted Yes Insurance
infoniaton
Indiana Open Yes Open Yes
if recoro Fair no.
ctonfjaj Procfer
Iowa Open Yes Open Yes Yes
Umled Fair o.
Pratices
Kansas Open Perps - Open Yes
Kentucky Open Yes Open
Louisiana Open Yes Open Yes
Indicates adoption of the Uniform MotorVehicle Certificate of Tle and Anti-theftAct (1955).
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Table C Cont. - State Statutes Affecting Privacy in Government Information
Systems Potentially Applicable to ITS
PuBuc RECORDS Vehicle & Vehicle ID PRIVACY
State Statutory Privacy Driver Number ACT
Requirement Exemption Records Registration
Maine Open Open Yes Yes
Maryland Open Yes Yes Yes
Massachusetts Open Yes Restricted Yes' Yes
M, chgan Open Yes Open Yes
Mnnesota Open Byagency Restrcted eYes
ciassircatJono
Mississippi Open - must Yes Show need Yes Yes
vide rt&-est to access
Missoud Open Restricted Yes
Montana Open Yes Open Yes
Nebraska Open Open Yes
Nevada Open Restricted Yes
New Hampshire Open Yes Umited Yes
New Jersey Open
New Medco Open Yes
NewYork Open Yes Regstnaon Yes Yes
info. open
North Carolina Open
North Dakota Open Open
Ohio Open Open Yes Yes
Oklahoma Open Yes Ceexdnf Yes
Oregon Open Yes Open- s
Pennsylvania Open Yes Closed unies Yes
Rhode island Open Yes Yes Yes
Indicates adoption of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Antilheft Act (1955).
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Table C Cent - State Statutes Affecting Privacy in Government Information
Systems Potentially Applicable to ITS
PUBuC RECORDS Vehicle & Vehicle ID PRIVACY
State Statutory Privacy Driver Number ACT
Requirement Exemption Records Registration
South Carolina Open Yes Ceordnta Yes
South Dakota Open Dlsce
Tennessee Open Yes Yes
Texas Open Open
Utah Open Yes Open Yes
on request
Vermont Open Yes Open Yes
Virginia Open Yes Open Yes Yes
Washington Open Yes Open Yes
no business
sodairen
West Virginla Open Yes Open
n request
Wisconsln Open Yes Open Yes Yes
Pduncycowta
Wyoming Open Yes Open Yes
Narrow
Indicates adoption of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Tle and Anti-theft Act (1955).
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Table D
State Statutes Regulating Private Sector Interferences with Privacy
Potentially Applicable to ITS
General Unauthorized
Privacy Access to Consumer Financial Employee
State Statute Computerized Credit Information Records
Data Prohibited Information
Alabama Yes Yes
Alaska Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arizona Yes Yes Yes
Arkansas Yes Yes
California Yes Yes Yes Yes
tafng tbue ino. resticted
Colorado Yes Yes Yes
_ _ _ _ _ adr - statut _
Connecticut Yes Yes Yes
Delaware Yes Yes Yes Yes
Districtof Columbia Yes Yes
Florida Yes
Georgia Yes
Hawal Yes Yes Yes
Idaho Yes Yes
Illinois Yes Cted Union Yes
records
Indiana Yes Yes Yes
Iowa Yes Yes
EFT pritacy
Kansas Yes Yes Yes
Kentucky Yes- r.o.. Yes Yes Yes
Louisiana Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maine Yes- ,ca, Yes Yes Yes
1995]
Table D ConL
PRIVACY & INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION
- State Statutes Regulating Private Sector Interferences with
Privacy Potentially Applicable to ITS
General Unauthorized
Privacy Access to Consumer Financial Employee
State Statute Computerized Credit Information Records
Data Prohibited Information
Maryland Yes Yes Yes Yes
- tf Vwdd wa db
Massachusetts Yes Yes Yes
ichlgan Yes Yes Yes Yes
Minnesota Yes Yes Yes Yes - ATM
Mississippi Yes Yes
Missouri Yes Yes
Montana Yes Yes Yes- r
Nebraska Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nevada Yes Yes Yes Yes
New Hampshire Yes Yes
New Jersey Yes Yes
NewMexico Yes Yes Yes Yes
NewYork Yes Yes Yes
North Carolina Yes Yes Yes
North Dakota Yes Yes
Ohio Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes
Oregon Yes Yes Yes Yes
- s~tuta
Pennsylvania Yes Yes Yes
Rhode Island Yes Yes Yes
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Table D Cont. - State Statutes Regulating Private Sector Interferences with
Privacy Potentially Applicable to ITS
General Unauthorized
Privacy Access to Consumer Financial Employee
State Statute Computerized Credit Information Records
Data Prohibited Information
South Carolna Yes Yes Yes
South Dakota Yes
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes
Texas Yes
Utah Yes Yes
Vermont Yes Yes
Virginia Yes Yes Yes
Washington Yes Yes
West Virginia Yes Yes
suam swaf
Wisconsin Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wyoming Yes YesI 8txtg stteIIII I
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Table E
Invasion of Privacy Damage Actions Potentially Applicable to ITS
Common Statutory Appro- False Public
State Law Tort Damage priation Light Intrusion Disclosure
Action Tr-ge Tt rtud Ttwog T0rWntd
Alabama Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Alaska Yes Yes
Arizona Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arkansas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
California Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colorado Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Connecticut Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delaware Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Districtof Columbia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Florida Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Georgia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hawai Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idaho Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Illinois Yes Probably Probably Probably Probably
Indiana Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Iowa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kansas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kentucky Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Louisiana Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maine Yes- Narrow Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maryland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Massachusetts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Michigan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Minnesota Disapproved OUappmcoved Disappcsved Disapvised Oisapproved
Mississippi Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table E Cont. - Invasion of Privacy Damage Actions Potentially Applicable to ITS
common Statutory Appro- False Public
State Law Tort Damage priation Light Intrusion Disclosure
Action T M T.fd, 5 M d o d TodI ,.d
Missouri Yes Yes Pesfps not Yes Yes
Montana Yes Yes
Nebraska Yes - Restere Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nevada Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
New Hampshire Yes Yes
New Jersey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
New Medco Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
New York Yes - RestateMet Yes Yes
________________ Dreaptxeved_____
North Carolina Yes Yes DisapVed Yes Dluptmd
North Dakota RestemetDsapproved
OiO Yes Yes pelnaps not Yes Yes
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yea
Oregon Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pennsylvania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rhode Island Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
South Carolina Yes Yes Yes Yes
South Dakota Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tennessee Yes Yes
Texas Yes Yes
Utah Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vermont Yes Yes Yes Yes
Virginia Yes Yes Yes Yes
Washington Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
West Virginia Yes 'Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wisconsin Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wyoming Uncertain I I
'Restatement" Refers to the four damage actions for invasion of privacy described In the
Restatement Second, of Torts, Sections 652A- 6521.
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